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H. THRONSON 
Case NO. 890547-CA 
District Court No. 87-4904318 
Category No. 7 
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari requests this Court to 
review the following questions: 
1. Did the Court of Appeals have the authority to modify 
the temporary alimony award of the trial court and award 
permanent alimony instead? 
2. Was the Court of Appeals' decision in awarding 
permanent alimony supported by the facts, and the law in the 
State of Utah. 
REPORT OF THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at Thronson 
v. Thronson, 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah Ct. App. March 25, 1991) 
[hereinafter Thronson], and is appended hereto as Exhibit 1. 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS BASED 
The Petition of the Defendant/Appellee is based upon the 
provisions of § 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) and Rule 
45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 46 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the considerations 
governing the review of certiorari. The Petition has failed to 
specifically identify the consideration(s) which require this 
Court to grant the Petition. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
1. Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
2. Olsen v. Olsen. 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985). 
3. Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
cert. granted, Sept. 7, 1988. 
4. English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). 
In addition, the other case law set forth hereafter is 
determinative in the issues raised in the Petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The parties were married for ten years and nine months. 
2. The parties have one son of this marriage, Patrick, age 
nine. 
3. Ms. Thronson, while a pharmacist, interrupted her 
career and its development to become the primary care-taker of 
the child and worked part-time for that reason during the 
marriage. (T.R. 172 - 174) 
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4. That during the pendency of the divorce, Ms. Thronson 
was required to utilize her savings and inheritance to meet her 
monthly living expenses. (T.R. 257, 295) Furthermore, Ms. 
Thronson was required to incur debts in order to finance her 
minimal living expenses during this period of time. (T.R. 333) 
5. At the time of the trial Ms. Thronson was employed 
part-time at 16 hours a week earning $15.50 per hour. (T.R. 173, 
217-218) During the pendency of the action and prior to trial 
Ms. Thronson received temporary child support of $1,000 per month 
and temporary alimony of $1,000 per month plus one of the 
annuities. (T.R. 139 and Defendant's Exhibit 38 admitted at T.R. 
553) 
6. The annuity which was awarded to Ms. Thronson in the 
amount of $989.45 per month will expire and terminate on December 
15, 1991. Additionally, the Defendant was awarded the other 
annuity of the parties paying $1,004.50 per month which expired 
in March of 1991. (Defendant's Exhibit 38 admitted at T.R. 553) 
7. At the time of the trial Mr. Thronson was a practicing 
attorney earning income of $94,476 per year with expenses of 
$4,003 per month. (Opinion of the Court of Appeals, p. 13). 
9. Ms. Thronson had monthly expenses at the time of the 
trial of $3,700 per month. (Opinion of the Court of Appeals, p. 
13) . 
10. Ms. Thronson has the ability to earn $35,000 per year 
when working full-time thus leaving an annual deficit between her 
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ability to produce income for herself, and the needs as found by 
the trial court of $9,400 annually. (Opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, p. 13). 
11. Throughout these proceedings Ms. Thronson has stated a 
claim for permanent alimony and equitable restitution 
(Appellants Reply Brief at p. 12, T.R. 350, 352). 
12. In the Complaint for divorce Ms. Thronson requested 
permanent alimony of $2,000 per month, together with "such other 
and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper." 
(See Complaint for Divorce, Exhibit 2) 
13. Mr. Thronson petitioned the Court of Appeals for 
rehearing alleging, principally, that the Court of Appeals had 
misunderstood the trial court's ruling and finding of gross 
monthly income on the part of Ms. Thronson. The Court of Appeals 
denied the Petition for Rehearing on May 21, 1991. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR, THRONSON HAS NOT MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
RULE 46 FOR THE GRANTING OF THE PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI, 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides in 
part: 
Review by a Writ of Certiorari is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, 
and will be granted only for special and 
important reasons, (emphasis added) 
Rule 46, Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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The Rule goes on to spell out the four important reasons 
that the Supreme Court may consider in passing on a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with the 
decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law in 
a way that is in conflict with the decision 
of the Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed 
from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned 
such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power 
of supervision; or, 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state or 
federal law which has not, but should be, 
settled by the Supreme Court. 
Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
It is important to note that the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari has failed to specify what consideration it claims 
should be relied upon by this Court in granting the Petition. 
However, the Petition would appear to qualify or to state grounds 
only under Rule 46(c) claiming, apparently, that the decision of 
the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings so as to call for review. 
As will be demonstrated, the Court of Appeals' decision is 
consistent with established Utah law both as to its authority to 
award permanent alimony, and as to the equity of that decision. 
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For these reasons, the requirements of Rule 46 are not met 
and this Court must deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS AUTHORITY TO MODIFY 
A LOWER COURT DECISION AND GRANT PERMANENT 
ALIMONY IN THIS CASE, 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari seems to claim that not 
only is permanent alimony unjustified given the facts of this 
case, but that the Court of Appeals could not have awarded 
permanent alimony for: 
(1) Want of authority; and, 
(2) Failure to raise the issue below. 
This court modified the trial court's award of temporary 
alimony and awarded permanent alimony instead in Olsen v. Olsen, 
704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985): 
Therefore, under our discretionary power to 
modify the final Decree in a divorce action, 
we hereby modify the Decree of Divorce in 
this case to provide for permanent alimony 
from defendant to plaintiff. Again, should 
the circumstance change in the future, the 
defendant may petition the court to modify 
the Decree under its continuing jurisdiction. 
Id. at 566-567, citing Hialev v. Hialev, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983) 
and Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979). 
In Olsen not only did the court acknowledge the 
discretionary power of appellate courts to modify a Decree of 
Divorce, but also set forth the wisdom and justification for 
permanent alimony awards in cases such as this. Given, the 
continuing jurisdiction of the courts over alimony awards, an 
alimony award should be permanent and not anticipate changes in 
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circumstances which are not presently ascertainable with a high 
degree of certainty. Otherwise, an alimony award which is made 
temporary may be based upon circumstances which may never occur 
and are purely speculative. 
In this case, there were no findings and no evidence to 
support any findings that the disparity in income between Mr. and 
Mrs. Thronson would ever diminish. Likewise, there were no facts 
and could be no finding that Ms. Thronson's needs or ability to 
meet those needs would ever change. 
However, if those circumstances were to substantially change 
in the future, either party would have the right to seek a 
modification of the Decree. 
In Rudman v. Rudman. 16 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Utah Ct. App. May 
28, 1991), the court noted: 
The second error of law is that any future 
social security award is too speculative, 
absent a specific finding as to the date and 
the amount of the future award. 
Id. at 38. 
In Rudman, the lower court awarded alimony until the wife 
reached the age of 65 and would receive social security benefits. 
There, as in this case, any reason for terminating alimony would 
be too speculative. In this case, unlike Rudman, no finding was 
made at all with regard to any future circumstances which would 
alleviate the need for alimony on the part of Ms. Thronson. Mr. 
Thronson is protected, in any case, by his opportunity to seek a 
modification if that did occur. 
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In addition to permanent alimony, Ms. Thronson requested 
equitable restitution, or alimony in an increased amount paid 
presently and for a shorter period of time. There are many 
reasons that would justify such a request for the present use of 
alimony in an increased amount rather than waiting for lower 
installments paid over a longer period of time. 
Secondly, the Petition suggests that the Court should not 
have granted a permanent alimony award because it was not 
requested below. The Complaint of the Plaintiff specifically 
asks for permanent alimony in the amount of $2,000 (See Exhibit 
2). At various times thereafter, Ms. Thronson sought various 
forms of relief including alimony, alimony limited by years and 
amount but increased from that awarded by the lower court or the 
Court of Appeals, and equitable restitution. The different 
relief claimed at various times by Ms. Thronson was likely 
dictated by tactical considerations and Ms. Thronson's own 
perception of her future circumstances at any given time. In 
addition, Ms. Thronson, prayed for just and reasonable relief in 
the discretion of the Court after being advised of all the facts. 
It was in the exercise of that request, as well as the authority 
cited above, that the Court of Appeals modified the lower court 
decision and granted a permanent alimony award. 
In Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
cert, granted, Sept. 7, 1988, Plaintiff raised the issue of the 
adequacy of child support and alimony on appeal. There, as here, 
the trial court had awarded temporary alimony. Relying upon 
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Olsen, the Court of Appeals found that the lower court had abused 
its discretion in limiting the award of alimony to a period of 
five years, and, instead awarded permanent alimony. There is no 
indication in Martinez that the Plaintiff sought permanent 
alimony, but rather, raised only the general question of the 
sufficiency of the alimony award on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING IS CONSISTENT 
WITH UTAH CASE LAW, 
At the heart of Mr. Thronson's Petition is his belief that, 
"Alimony is now designed primarily to assist the formerly 
dependent or semi-dependent spouse to achieve or re-achieve 
financial self-sufficiency so as to vitiate further need for 
alimony.". (Appellee's Petition for Rehearing, page 13, 
Appellee's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, page 14) Except for 
a Maryland case, Mr. Thronson suggests no authority for that 
notion. 
Furthermore, Mr. Thronson proposes, "Most people, when they 
are faced with a differential between their income and expenses, 
either raise their income, through working more hours or 
selecting other employment, or reduce their expenses to a level 
which they are capable of paying.". (Appellee's Brief, page 14) 
Mr. Thronson suggests that that principal be applied only to Ms. 
Thronson and not himself. 
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Mr. Thronson goes on to suggest that alimony should not be a 
"lifetime pension" nor should it encourage substantial 
underemployment or discourage self sufficiency.1 
Nowhere in the Petition for Rehearing or Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari is the real standard for the award of alimony, in 
Utah, mentioned or discussed. However, the findings of the lower 
court do address the basis for determining alimony, and the Court 
of Appeals decision is based upon those findings. 
In Utah an alimony award should, "to the extent possible, 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living and maintain 
them at a level as close as possible to that standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage." Howell v. Howell, 155 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 18, p. 20, (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076) (Utah 
1988)). See also, Paffell v. Paffell, 732 P.2d 96, 100-101 (Utah 
1986) and Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985). Furthermore, 
"An alimony award should, to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties' respective post-divorce living standards. . .", Rasband 
v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The process for analyzing an alimony award is 
straightforward and long established by case law in this state. 
1
 It should be remembered that the Court of Appeals 
arrived at its decision to award permanent alimony after 
ratifying the lower court regarding Ms. Thronson's full-time 
income and inability to meet her present needs nonetheless. 
Therefore, it cannot be argued that the alimony in this case will 
discourage Ms. Thronson's full-time employment when it is one of 
the assumptions accounted for in the award of alimony. 
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This Court correctly set forth the three considerations in making 
an alimony award as follows: 
(1) The financial condition and needs of the party 
seeking alimony; 
(2) The party's ability to produce sufficient income 
for him or herself; and 
(3) The ability of the other party to provide support. 
Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), (citing 
English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977)) 
After determining the financial needs and resources of the 
parties, "the court should set alimony as permitted by those 
parameters, to approximate the parties' standard of living during 
the marriage as closely as possible. It follows that if the 
payor/spouses resources are adequate alimony need not be limited 
to provide for only basic needs, but should also consider the 
recipient's spouse's station in life." Howell v. Howell, 155 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18, at p. 20. (quoting Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 
144, 147 (Utah 1978)). 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari suggests that the Court 
of Appeals' decision is not consistent with any Utah case law. 
In Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988) the Supreme Court 
upheld a permanent alimony award of $750 per month where the 
husband had yearly income approaching $100,000 per year and the 
wife was in her early 30s, in good health, well educated and 
working as a full-time teacher, earning over $27,000 annually. 
The permanent alimony award was sustained even though the wife 
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received a large cash settlement at the time of the divorce in 
the amount of $164,000, as well as substantial amounts of 
personal property. The parties had been married less than 13 
years. 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari attempts to minimize the 
impact of the Davis case suggesting that it is an isolated case. 
However, the facts of Davis, as well as the facts in this case, 
meet the established criteria for the award of alimony rather 
than a mythical "profile" that the Petition has created as the 
basis for an alimony award. 
The Petition places an extraordinary amount of weight on the 
fact that these parties were married almost 11 years. Not only 
is that a sufficient time given the alimony considerations and 
the process for awarding alimony described above, it is also an 
inappropriate consideration. "The standard utilized by the trial 
court, viz. the length of the marriage and the contributions of 
each to their joint financial success, is not an appropriate 
measure to determine alimony." English v. English, 565 P.2d 4 09 
(Utah 1977). 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF PERMANENT ALIMONY IS FAIR AND 
EQUITABLE. 
The Petition suggests that the award of permanent alimony is 
unfair because Ms. Thronson was awarded "substantial financial 
support", a "substantial cash payment" and a "substantial 
inheritance". The Petition does not set forth how these items 
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affect Ms. Thronson's ability to produce income for herself and 
meet her needs. 
Ms. Thronson was awarded one of the parties annuities paying 
$989 per month. That annuity will terminate in December, 1991. 
Mr. Thronson received the other annuity paying over $1,000 per 
month which likewise terminates in 1991. 
Ms. Thronson received an inheritance from the estate of her 
deceased brother prior to the divorce trial. However, because 
her support during that period of time was insufficient the 
entire inheritance amount was depleted. (T.R. 177, 179 and 256-
257) . 
The limited partnership interest awarded to Ms. Thronson and 
valued at $11,000 provides no monthly cash flow. Obviously, the 
pension and IRA interests provide no present income or cash flow. 
In fact, Ms. Thronson7s IRA has been Mcashed-in" to pay for her 
monthly living expenses resulting from the deficiency which 
occurred after alimony terminated more than a year ago. Ms. 
Thronson has been forced to sell her home because she could no 
longer maintain it without alimony. The cash award to Ms. 
Thronson was in the amount of $2,002 which was the cash payment 
at the end of the trial from defendants stock in his law firm, 
which amount has likewise been consumed to meet her monthly 
living expenses after the termination of alimony per the Decree 
of Divorce. 
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, is the fact that 
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari entirely ignores the Court of 
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Appeals' observation that Mr. Thronson had earned income at the 
time of the divorce in the amount of $94,476 annually. 
Presumably, Mr. Thronson accepts that finding as accurate. That 
being the case, the Petition for Rehearing absolutely ignores the 
remarkable disparity in income between these parties. Ms. 
Thronson7s experience over the past years has borne out this 
Court's observation that, "She will face a substantial income 
shortfall compared with her needs". (Court of Appeals' decision 
pp. 55-56) This is in spite of the fact that even when paying 
alimony, Mr. Thronson still had discretionary income above and 
beyond that necessary to meet his monthly expenses. 
In contrast to Mr. Thronson's "profile" standard for 
determining alimony, which it arbitrarily ignores the cases which 
do not fit the supposed "profile", the law in the state of Utah 
is based upon fairness, equity and ascertainable standards which 
are set forth above. If the "profile" standard were adopted by 
this court, not only would it absolutely ignore the standard 
which has governed the award of alimony for many years, but it 
would perpetuate the hardship of Ms. Thronson which has existed 
since the termination of alimony under the divorce Decree. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition fails to set forth any basis sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. In fact, no basis is identified in the body 
of the Petition which could be relied upon to grant a Writ of 
Certiorari in this case. The Court of Appeals has properly 
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Certiorari in this case. The Court of Appeals has properly 
exercised its discretionary authority to modify a final Decree of 
Divorce and award permanent alimony. The decision of the Court 
of Appeals is consistent with the request made various times by 
Ms. Thronson for permanent alimony commencing with her Complaint 
for Divorce. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals, based upon the 
findings of the trial court, meets the three-pronged test for 
alimony which has long governed that issue in Utah. The 
"profile" standard asserted in the Petition, if it ever was 
viable, has not been relied upon in Utah for decades and should 
not be a basis for re-examining the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. 
The circumstances of these parties in particular Ms. 
Thronson's inability to produce income to meet her needs acquired 
during the marriage, and Mr. Thronson's ability to do so, justify 
a permanent alimony award. Alimony was reasonable and warranted 
on a temporary basis and there is no basis upon which to find 
that those circumstances will change, therefore, a permanent 
alimony award was in order. 
DATED THIS QSj^-day of July, 1991. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
GREEN & BERRY 
V. \n)kd 
'FREDERICK N. GREEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Attorneys: Paul H. Liapis, Helen 
Luhn, Salt Lake City, 
Clark W. Sessions and 
City, for Appellee 
E. Christian, and Kim M. 
for Appellant 
Dean C. Andreasen, Salt Lake 
Before Judges Bench, Garff and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Mary Thronson appeals provisions of a divorce decree and 
separate order awarding joint legal custody of a child, child 
support, alimony, and property. We remand for further 
proceedings regarding child custody and support. We modify the 
alimony award and affirm the remainder of the decree. 
FACTS 
The parties were married on September 30, 1978. Their 
marriage was the first for both. She was a full-time 
pharmacist and he a full-time attorney. A son was born to them 
on September 11, 1981. She became the child's primary 
caretaker and a part-time pharmacist. He became a shareholder 
in his law firm. She filed a complaint for divorce. He filed 
a counterclaim for divorce. They were divorced by a decree 
entered June 23, 1989. A separate order of joint legal custody 
was also entered. Further relevant facts will be set forth 
below in our treatment of the respective issues. 
CHILD CUSTODY AWARD 
Ms. Thronson challenges the joint legal custody decree and 
order on two grounds: (1) She did not agree to the order of 
joint legal custody and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 (1989) 
required the agreement of both parents at the time of this 
decree and order. (2) The provision for an automatic award of 
sole custody to one parent when the other moves from the state 
was error. 
CHILD CUSTODY IN UTAH 
Prior to 1988, Utah did not have a statute expressly 
authorizing an award of "joint legal custody"1 of a child. Our 
1. Custody terminology: Many legislators, judges and writers 
have been loose with their "joint" custody language. Early 
articles identified this vexing problem as follows: 
Both the forms of custody [sole, divided, 
split, joint] following divorce and the terms 
which describe them are vague and 
overlapping. The lack of standard 
definitions and the courts' tendency to use 
certain terms interchangeably have created 
confusion. 
Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 
12 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 523, 525 (1979). 
Often, when referring to one of these custody 
arrangements, courts use vague language or 
inadequately defined terms. 
Bratt, Joint Custody. 67 Ky. L.J. 271, 283 (1978-79). 
One author points out that considerable semantic confusion 
has resulted possibly because the "term" joint custody predates 
the "concept* of joint custody as it is known today. He 
states: "I have encountered at least fifteen terms used to 
refer to various alternatives to sole custody: joint legal 
custody, joint physical custody, divided custody, separate 
custody, alternating custody, split custody, managing 
conservatorship, possessory conservatorship, equal custody, 
shared custody, partial custody, custody 'given to neither 
party to the exclusion of the other,• temporary custody, 
shifting custody, and concurrent custody." Miller, Jfljjlt 
Custody, 13(3) Fam. L.Q. 345, 360 n. 79 (1979). 
890547-CA 2 
divorce statutes have contained various child custody-
provisions since 1903. For many years Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
(1989) has authorized district courts to include in divorce 
decrees "equitable orders relating to the children, property 
and parties." Further, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 has contained 
various specific provisions regarding factors to be considered 
in awarding sole custody of a child. See Lembach v. Cox, 639 
P.2d 197 (Utah 1981); 1 Utah L.Rev. 363 (1989) (historical 
development of child custody factors and preferences in Utah). 
"Joint Legal Custody" was specifically added to the sole 
custody statute in 1988, and designated as § 30-3-10.1 to 
-10.4. We emphasize that this is a joint "legal" custody 
statute and not a joint "physical" custody statute. In the 
1988 Utah legislative session, Senator Hillyard stated: "This 
is not joint physical custody. The child obviously can't live 
in two homes. But it's joint legal custody which would give 
the non-custodial parent more involvement in the decisions of 
child raising." Floor Debate, (Feb. 3, 1988) Sen. Recording 
No. 42, side 2. In section 10.1 the legislature provided its 
definition of joint legal custody: 
In this chapter, "joint legal custody" 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, 
privileges, duties, and powers of a parent by 
both parents, where specified; 
(2) may include an award of exclusive 
authority by the court to one parent to make 
specific decisions; 
(3) does not affect the physical custody 
of the child except as specified in the order 
of joint legal custody; 
(4) is not based on awarding equal or 
nearly equal periods of physical custody of 
and access to the child to each of the 
parents, as the best interest of the child 
often requires that a primary physical 
residence for the child be designated; and 
(5) does not prohibit the court from 
specifying one parent as the primary 
caretaker and one home as the primary 
residence of the child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1 (1989). Subsections (1) and (2) 
define joint legal custody: both parents share the authority 
and responsibility to make basic decisions regarding their 
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child's welfare. Subsections (3), (4) and (5) tell us what 
joint legal custody is not — it is not joint physical 
custody. We note that this statute does not contain a 
definition of nor a provision for "joint physical custody." 
Subsection 10.2(1) created a "rebuttable presumption" that 
joint legal custody is in the best interest of a child. But, 
that presumption was made subject to subsection (2) which 
provided: 
The court may order joint legal custody if it 
determines that: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint 
legal custody; 
(b) joint legal custody is in the best 
interest of the child; and 
(c) both parents appear capable of 
implementing joint legal custody. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 (1989). 
The order remains discretionary with the court, not 
mandatory, even when all three conditions are satisfied, i.e., 
(1) parental agreement, (2) best interests, and (3) parents 
capable of implementation. Further sections of the statute 
emphasize its "parental agreement" posture. We note that 
section 10.3 — terms of joint legal custody order — contains 
two further subsections dealing with parental agreement: 
(2) The court shall, where possible, include 
in the order the terms agreed to between the 
parties; . . . 
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute 
resolution procedure the parties agree to use 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989). Moreover, the termination 
provisions, section 10.4, confer upon one parent the right to 
unilaterally terminate the order of joint legal custody. The 
order can be terminated simply by filing and serving a motion. 
Once the motion is filed, the court is required to replace the 
order "with an order of sole legal custody under Section 
30-3-10.H Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 (1989). This provision 
emphasizes the parental agreement stance of the statute as 
initially adopted and in force at the time of this divorce. 
We return to section 10.2(3) to point out that the 
legislature created a list of factors the court sliali consider 
in determining the best interest of a child in the context of 
joint legal custody (not joint physical custody). Those 
factors are: 
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(a) whether the physical, psychological, and 
emotional needs and development of the child 
will benefit from joint legal custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first 
priority to the welfare of the child and 
reach shared decisions in the child's best 
interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of 
encouraging and accepting a positive 
relationship between the child and the other 
parent; 
(d) whether both parents participated in 
raising the child before the filing of the 
suit; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes 
of the parents; 
(f) if the child is 12 years of age or older, 
any preference of the child for or against 
joint legal custody; and 
(g) any other factors the court finds 
relevant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(3) (1989). On the other hand, the 
legislature did not offer any guidance to trial courts to 
assist in determining the "capability" of the parents. The 
term is not defined. Section 10.4 contains provisions for (1) 
modification of a joint legal custody order, (2) termination of 
the order discussed above, and (3) attorneys fees based on 
frivolous pleadings and harassment. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-10.4 (1989). The modification provisions appear to be a 
codification of the Hoaae v. Hoqqe. 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) 
bifurcated procedure used in sole custody modifications. Prior 
to adoption of this statute in 1988, the only reported Utah 
case dealing directly with an initial award of "joint custody" 
was Lembach v. Cox, supra. There*, the court stated "a custody 
arrangement, joint or otherwise, is within the broad equitable 
powers of the court." Further, the court said "[t]he fact that 
the father and the mother could not negotiate a joint custody 
arrangement demonstrates the inappropriateness of ordering 
joint custody." 639 P.2d at 200.2 
2. Other Utah reported cases involving joint custody are: 
Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507 (Utah 1985) (modification hearing 
of an initial award of joint custody); Becker v. Becker, 694 
P.2d 608 (Utah 1984) (on modification hearing, it was noted 
that trial court considered joint custody but did not order it 
in initial decree). 
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Prior to 1980, a handful of states including California 
had adopted various forms of "joint custody" statutes. During 
the 1980's "joint custody" was in vogue and a second wave of 
states adopted "joint custody" statutes. Utah became the 
thirty-second state (and apparently the last) caught up in this 
wave. 2 Family Law and Practice* § 32.04 (A. Rutkin ed. 1990 & 
Supp.) (hereinafter "Fam. Law").3 
California, the acknowledged pioneer of no-fault divorce 
and joint custody, retrenched in 1988 regarding joint custody. 
California's 1979 statute contained a "presumption . . . that 
joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child where 
the parents have agreed to an award of joint custody." Cal. 
Civ. Code § 4600.5(a) (West 1979). In 1983, California amended 
its joint custody statute to include a specific definition of 
both "physical" custody and "legal" custody. The California 
Legislature recognized the need to be more specific when in 
1983 it defined joint legal custody to mean "both parents shall 
share the right and responsibility to make decisions relating 
to the health, education and welfare of the child," Cal. Civ. 
Code § 4600.5(d), and defined joint physical custody as "each 
of the parents . . . [have] significant periods of physical 
custody." Cal. Civ. Code § 4600.5(d)(5) (West 1988). A team 
3. The child custody reform of the eighties gained impetus 
from ongoing no-fault divorce legislative reform. Utah added 
"irreconcilable differences" to its list of nine fault-based 
grounds in 1987. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(3)(a) (1987). "Both 
reforms took place with no public commitment or private 
initiative for the systematic assessment of the legal changes 
on patterns of custody or on child welfare. As fashions change 
and new interest groups emerge, family law is at risk of 
becoming a series of experiments that never report results in 
ways that can help inform the legislative process." Zimring, 
Foreword to Sugarman & Kay, Divorce Reform at the Crossroads, 
at viii (1990). As no-fault made divorce virtually automatic, 
fathers* groups began to protest a pro-mother bias in child 
custody decisions. At the same time, feminist groups began 
attacking legal standards which were gender-specific as 
inherently discriminatory. Then, fathers* groups turned the 
idea of gender-neutrality to their advantage in the child 
custody arena. These opposing forces set the stage for "joint 
custody" statutes based on the rationale of "equality" rather 
than "equity- and children end up taking a back seat to the 
drivers, i.e., their divorcing parents. One writer succinctly 
summed up the result: "This modern trend illustrates a move 
backward toward the more explicit treatment of children as 
property — only this time the property is to be divided 
equally." Fineman, Dominant Discourse. Professional Language, 
and Legal Change In Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L. 
Rev. 727, 739-40 (1988). 
890547-CA 6 
of Stanford professionals proposed the need to consider "joint 
custody" as having a third form — the actual residential 
arrangement for the child.4 Later, a California Task Force 
recommended that existing joint custody provisions be clarified 
to indicate that no statutory presumption exists in favor of 
joint custody. In response, subsection (d) was added: 
This section establishes neither a 
preference nor a presumption for or 
against joint legal custody, joint 
physical custody, or sole custody, but 
allows the courts and the family the 
widest discretion to choose a parenting 
plan which is in the best interests of the 
child or children. 
Cal. Civ. Code § 4600(d) (West Supp. 1989). 
Coincidentally, while this appeal was pending, the 1990 
Utah Legislature substantially amended its two year-old joint 
legal custody statute deleting the "rebuttable presumption" 
favoring joint legal custody. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 
(1989 & Supp. 1990). However, the legislature retained its 
initial definition of "joint legal custody," section 30-3-10.1, 
and the list of seven factors courts are reguired to consider 
in determining the best interests of the child in the context 
of joint legal custody. Section 30-3-10.2(3)(a-g). Also 
retained in the statute is some language regarding parental 
agreement: "The court shall, where possible, include in the 
order [joint legal custody order] the terms agreed to between 
the parties [parents]," § 30-3-10.3(2) (emphasis added), and, 
"The agreement may contain a dispute resolution procedure the 
parties agree to use . . . ." § 30-3-10.3(5) (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989)._ Our legislature's change of 
position on the "rebuttable presumption" in favor of joint 
legal custody and the 
4. "There are actually three aspects of joint custody: the 
legal custody agreement, the physical custody agreement and the 
actual residential arrangement for the child. It is important 
to investigate the three forms of joint custody separately to 
understand the implications of each for the functioning of the 
post-divorce family." Albiston, Maccoby, & Mnookin, Does Joint 
Legal Custody Matter?. Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 167, 168 (1990). 
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necessity of parental agreement creates confusion concerning 
the public policy basis for the joint legal custody statute. 
Utah and California appear to be the first and only states to 
retrench from a presumption in favor of joint (legal) custody 
after having adopted the presumption. Due to the paucity of 
pre-statute and absence of post-statute joint custody reported 
decisions in Utah, plus the fact that Utah's statute is not 
like that of any other state, we are left to decide an issue of 
first impression with little useful precedent. Ms. Thronson 
argues that we should apply the 1990 version of the joint legal 
custody statute, i.e., apply the amendments retroactively. We 
decline to do so. The 1990 amendments did not make a mere 
procedural change or simply clarify how the 1988 statute should 
have been understood originally. The amendments were 
substantial and substantive, thus retroactive application is 
not appropriate. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1369 n. 4 
(Utah 1982). 
ANALYSIS OF JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY AWARD 
UNDER § 30-3-10.1 to -10.4 
As noted above, the majority of states have adopted 
statutes expressly authorizing some form of "joint custody" 
award. Those statutes come in four basic forms: 
1. joint custody as an option only where 
the parties petition or agree; 
2. joint custody as an option; 
3. joint custody as a presumption or 
preference; 
4. joint custody split into joint legal 
custody and joint physical custody. 
Fam. Law. § 32.06[2]. Initially, Utah combined forms 1 and 3. 
Now, Utah is form 2, but only as to joint "legal" custody. 
Here, the trial court faced Utah's initial statute with a 
favorable presumption on one hand and the requirement of 
parents' agreement on the other. Ms. Thronson opposed a joint 
custody order. The trial court failed to meet the parental 
agreement requirement head-on. Instead, the court found "there 
exists substantial difficulty between the parties" and "it is 
in the best interests of the child for the parties to be 
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awarded joint legal custody." The court failed to find whether 
the parents agreed or disagreed as to an order of joint legal 
custody* At the time the court ruled, the statute stated: 
The court may order joint legal custody if 
it determines that: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of 
joint legal custody . . . 
§ 30-3-10.2(2)(a) (1989). 
The form of the statute required a threshold finding of 
parental "agreement." The trial court implicitly found 
"disagreement" but proceeded with the order. Moreover, the 
record reveals opposition to the order, i.e., no agreement. 
Several states have adopted the "parental agreement" form of 
joint custody statute, including Colorado, Texas and Kansas. 
The Colorado statute, for example, requires that any motion for 
joint custody be filed by both parties, Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 14-10-124(5) (1973), and that any plan for joint custody must 
be jointly agreed to by the parties, Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 14-10-124.5(5) (1973). In Colorado, a trial court ordered 
joint custody over the objection of the mother. The appellate 
court ruled that the award in the absence of agreement of the 
parties was an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of 
Posinoff, 683 P.2d 377, 378 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). S££ alSft 
Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 672 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)(court 
has no authority to award joint custody without agreement); 
Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Kan. App. 2d 284, 615 P.2d 806 
(1980)(without agreement, joint custody award unauthorized). 
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by 
imposing the order of joint legal custody on the parents and 
child. The statute required parental agreement. Here, there 
was parental opposition. See Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 200 
(Utah 1981)(inappropriate to order: joint custody where parents 
not in agreement). Thus, we vacate the order of joint legal 
custody. Due to our ruling and remand, we need not reach Ms. 
Thronson's challenge to the provision for automatic change of 
custody when one parent moves from the state. 
5. Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Wisconsin have also 
adopted similar statutes. Fam. Law § 32.06[2] at n. 45. 
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ANALYSIS OF CHILD CUSTODY 
UNDER § 30-3-10 
Our vacating of the order of joint legal custody is not 
necessarily dispositive of the issues of child custody, 
including legal custody, i.e., decision-making, and physical 
custody, i.e., caregiving and visitation rights. The trial 
court's findings might support a "best interests" custody award 
under § 30-3-10, although an award of joint legal custody was 
improper. However, both the court's memorandum decision and 
formal findings specify the court's reliance on the 
legislature's list of best interest factors in the joint legal 
custody statute § 30-3-10.2(3) enumerated above. On the other 
hand, § 30-3-10 provides: 
In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and 
the past conduct and demonstrated moral 
standards of each of the parties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1989) (emphasis added). 
Our Supreme Court has developed the best interest factors 
to be considered under this provision. 
We believe that the choice in competing 
child custody claims should instead be based 
on function-related factors. Prominent among 
these, though not exclusive, is the identity 
of the primary caretaker during the 
marriage. Other factors should include the 
identity of the parent with greater 
flexibility to provide personal care for the 
child and the identity of the parent with 
whom the child has spent most of his or her 
time pending custody determination if that 
period has been lengthy. Another important 
factor should be the stability of the 
environment provided by each parent. 
Pusev v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986) (emphasis 
added). See also Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 
1982); Rule 4-903(3) Utah Code of Jud. Admin. (1989) (requiring 
custody evaluators to consider and respond to a list of 
factors). 
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Our comparison of the two lists of factors reveals that 
they are not identical, although some similarities appear. 
Moreover, the context of the respective factors point the 
thrust of the trial court's inquiry in two different 
directions. As a result, the findings herein will not support 
an ultimate finding under § 30-3-10 that child custody should 
be placed with one parent or the other. Further, the findings 
contain internal disagreement. The memorandum decision states 
"the court desires the parties to arrange between themselves 
for reasonable and liberal visitation which they determine." 
To the same effect is formal finding number 61: "[i]t is in 
the best interests of the parties and their minor child to 
attempt to arrange between themselves reasonable and liberal 
visitation . . . . If the parties are unable to do so, the 
court will set a specific schedule." But, the court in formal 
finding number 65 took that promised privilege away from the 
parties stating — "[i]n light of an appropriate reasonable and 
liberal visitation schedule, it is reasonable that the parties' 
minor child will spend 57% of his time with plaintiff, who has 
primary physical custody, and 43% of his time with the 
defendant. The 57% visitation award to the mother provides 
the basis for the "primary physical custody" statement. This 
was the only time the trial court mentioned physical custody. 
This specification of visitation time surreptitiously imposed 
an award of joint physical custody upon the parties without 
proper consideration of the best interest factors under 
§ 30-3-10. We hold the findings to be inadequate to support 
any award of child custody because: 
(1) The trial court utilized best interest 
factors related to joint legal custody 
§ 30-3-10.2(3) and not the factors related to 
child custody § 30-3-10; 
(2) The findings are in conflict as to the 
determination of visitation rights, i.e., by 
the court or the parents; 
(3) The findings do not support any award of 
physical custody; and 
(4) Custody was awarded on the basis of a 
court imposed visitation time allocation. 
Our task is to act in the best interests of the child. We 
must vacate and remand the custody and visitation award. We do 
not remand simply for revision of the findings or with 
directions to modify the decree regarding these matters. 
During the interim, the facts regarding the parents and their 
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child and their relationships might have been dramatically 
changed. Further, the joint legal custody statute has been 
substantially amended. The current factual and legal 
circumstances should be examined before this matter is 
finalized. Thus, we remand for further fact finding and a new 
legal determination, utilizing whatever procedures and hearings 
the trial court deems necessary — consistent with this opinion. 
CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
Child support will have to be reconsidered in connection 
with the above remand. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.4 (Supp. 1990) 
reveals that the support obligation is intended to be a shared 
obligation of both parents. This obligation must be allocated 
in proportion to the parties' adjusted gross income pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 to -7.7. Subsection 7.5 lists the 
items of income to be included in gross income. It also lists 
two items to be subtracted from gross income to calculate 
adjusted gross income: alimony previously ordered and paid and 
child support previously ordered. Neither of those items is 
applicable here. Thus, gross income is the same as adjusted 
gross income in this case. But, the trial court failed to 
include income from nonearned sources as required by 
§ 78-45-7.5(1)(a). Moreover, the trial court averaged Mr. 
Thronson's earned income for several years rather than using 
"current earnings." Section 78-45-7.5(5)(b) indicates that 
current earnings are to be used. On remand, child support 
calculations should properly account for these items pursuant 
to the statutory requirements. 
ALIMONY AWARD 
The trial court awarded Ms. Thronson alimony of $800 per 
month for one year. Three factors must be considered by the 
trial court in making an alimony award: 
1. the financial condition and needs of the 
party seeking alimony; 
2. that party's ability to produce 
sufficient income for him or herself; and 
3. the ability of the other party to provide 
support. 
Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(citing English v. English. 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977)). 
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"Failure to analyze the parties' circumstances in light of 
these three factors constitutes an abuse of discretion." Ifl. 
(citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)). As 
long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the 
bounds and under the standards we have set and has supported 
its decision with adequate findings and conclusions, we will 
not disturb its rulings. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 
(Utah 1988) . 
Here, the trial court considered each of the alimony 
factors and entered findings. Ms. Thronson's actual and 
necessary monthly living expenses were found to be $3,700. She 
presented a higher figure, but the court heard evidence 
challenging certain items and found them to be overstated. Ms. 
Thronson's current earning capacity, as a full-time pharmacist, 
was found to be $35,000 a year gross. This finding was based 
on competent evidence and represents the midpoint of an annual 
gross salary range of $31,000 to $39,000. The final factor, 
Mr. Thronson's ability to provide support, i.e., his earning 
capacity, was considered by the trial court. He submitted a 
thirteen year summary of his income. The trial court used an 
average of the last eight years, after excluding some 
contingent fee income in three of those years. Thus, the court 
found Mr. Thronson's average gross income to be $71,376 
annually. This calculation and finding was in error. Mr. 
Thronson's schedule showed his current gross earning capacity 
to be $94,476 annually. Nevertheless, we cannot say that an 
award of $800 per month in alimony is an abuse of discretion* 
given the above factors and other financial circumstances of 
the parties. But, we do hold that the trial court abused its 
discretion in making the alimony non-permanent, i.e., for one 
year. 
The trial court found that "an annual income of $35,000 
should be imputed" to Ms. Thronson, i.e., she could earn that 
amount, assuming she was employed on a full-time basis. But, 
the court found her needs to be $3., 700 per month, i.e., $44,400 
annually. Accordingly, she is not capable of meeting her 
needs, she requires $9,400 annually to meet her needs, even 
when employed on a full-time basis. Thus, she will require 
the $800 per month ($9,600 annually) alimony for the forseeable 
future. Otherwise, she will face a substantial income 
shortfall compared to her needs. Further, the trial court 
found Mr. Thronson's actual and necessary monthly living 
expenses to be $4,300 per month, i.e., $51,600 annually. This 
leaves him with some discretionary income. These findings 
warrant an award of permanent alimony. The trial court abused 
its discretion in limiting the alimony award to one year. 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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We remand for modification of the alimony award to be permanent 
alimony of $800 per month. 
OTHER FINANCIAL AND 
PROPERTY AWARDS 
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a 
division of property in a divorce action. The trial court has 
considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property 
interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of 
validity. See Naranio, 751 P.2d at 1146. Ms. Thronson claims 
the trial court erred by failing to restore to her inheritance 
monies expended by her while the parties were separated prior 
to divorce; by failing to replace certain furniture removed by 
Mr. Thronson; and by failing to restore certain funds spent by 
Mr. Thronson after they separated. We have examined these 
items and find no abuse of trial court discretion. This court 
will not disturb a determination of financial and property 
interests unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of 
discretion. Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1335. Thus, we affirm the 
rulings on these matte*^. ^ 
4C-
Norman H. Jackson,^cfudge 
WE CONCUR: 
ft "J v?* ' 
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Tab 2 
MARY C. CORPORDN #734 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORDN & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
MARY THRONSON, 
Plaintiff, COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE 
-vs- Civil No. D87-
CHARLES THRONSON, Judge 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF to the above-entitled action, by and through 
counsel, and complains and alleges against the defendant as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is and has been a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah tor a period of three months or more immediately prior to the filing of 
the Complaint m this action, 
2. The parties to this action are husband and wife, having been married 
on September 30, 1978 in Omaha, Nebraska, 
3. Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties which make 
continuation of the marriage impossible, 
4. The parties maintained their marital domicile in Salt Lake County, 
State ot Utah and the acts complained ot herein occurred m Sale Lake County, 
State or Utah. 
5. There has been one child bom as issue of this marriage, namely, 
Patrick, bom September 11 , 1981 • Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be 
awarded the temporary and permanent care, custody and control of said minor 
child, subject to defendant's reasonable rights of visitation* 
6. Defendant should be ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of Six 
Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) per month, as and for child support, for the 
support and maintenance of the minor child children of the parties, until said 
child attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high school, whichever 
last occurs* 
7. If the defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears in his child 
support obligation, the plaintiff should be entitled to mandatory income 
withholding relief, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45(d)-1 , _et. 
jseq. (1984, as amended). 
8. Defendant should be ordered to maintain in force health and accident 
and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor child of the parties, until 
said minor child attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high school, 
whichever last occurs. Each party should be ordered to pay one-half of all 
medical, dental, orthodontic, optometric and psychotherapeutic expenses not 
covered by said insurance. 
9. Defendant should be ordered to maintain in force a policy of 
insurance on his own life, naming the minor child as the sole and absolute 
beneficiary of said life insurance policy, in the minimum face value of One 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000,00) , until said child reaches the age of 18 
years or graduates from high school, whichever last occurs. 
10. Defendant should be ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of Two 
Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) per month, as and for alimony, until the death or 
the plaintiff, the death of the defendant, or the remarriage or cohabitation 
of the plaintiff, whichever first occurs. 
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11. Defendant should be required to maintain plaintiff as a beneficiary 
on his health insurance policy for the maximum time allowable by law after the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce herein, with defendant to be responsible for 
payment of the preniums for said health insurance, in lieu of an award of 
additional alimony to the plaintiff. 
12. Defendant should be awarded the right to claim the minor child of 
the parties as a dependent for the purpose of the calculation of his state 
and federal income taxes, so long as he is current in his child support 
obligation for any tax year in which the minor child is so claimed. Plaintiff 
should be required to sign all documents necessary to enable defendant to 
claim the minor child in such a manner. 
13. During the course of their marriage, the parties have acquired an 
interest in real property commonly known as 2063 Hubbard Avenue, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84108. Plaintiff should be awarded the temporary and permanent 
use and possession of said real property, subject to the indebtedness thereon, 
which plaintiff should be ordered to pay and assume, and subject to a lien in 
behalf of the defendant for one-half the equity value in the property as of 
the date of filing of the Complaint for Divorce, which should become payable 
to defendant upon the first to occur of the following events: 
a. plaintiff* s remarriage or cohabitation in the home with a man 
other than the defendant; 
b. the minor child of the parties achieving the age of 18 years or 
graduating from high school, whichever last occurs; 
c. the death of the plaintiff; 
d. the sale of the real property at plaintiff's election; 
e. plaintiff's ceasing to use said real property as her primary 
place or residence. 
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14. During the course of their marriage, the parties have acquired 
certain automobiles, including a 1986 Mercedes 190, a 1986 Toyota Landcruiser, 
three motorcycles and a utility trailer. Plaintiff should be awarded the 
Mercedes automobile, free and clear of any interest of the defendant. 
Defendant should be awarded the Toyota Landcruiser, the motorcycles and the 
utility trailer, free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff. 
15. During the course of their marriage, the defendant has acquired an 
interest in a gun collection which should be awarded to the defendant, free 
and clear of any interest of the plaintiff. 
16. During the course • of their marriage, the parties have acquired 
certain items of personal effects, jewelry, clothing and belongings. Each 
party should be awarded his or her own personal items. 
17. During the course of their marriage, the parties have acquired 
certain items of household furnishings, fixtures and appliances, which items 
should be awarded to the plaintiff, free and clear of any interest of the 
defendant. 
18. During the course of their marriage, the defendant has acquired an 
interest in a retirement plan through his employer which should be divided 
equally between the parties according to the "Woodward" formula, 
19. During the course of their marriage, the parties have acquired an 
interest in certain banking accounts, which accounts should be diviced equally 
between the parties according to monetary value. 
20. During the course of their marriage, each party has acquired an 
interest in an inheritance or insurance proceeds by reason of the death of a 
member of his or her family. Specifically, plaintiff has acquired an 
inheritance by reason of the death of her brother. Defendant has acquired an 
inheritance by reason ot the death of his grandmother. Each parr; should 
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receive his or her own separate inheritance, free and clear of any interest of 
the other party, since these inheritances are not marital assets. 
21. During the course of their marriage, the defendant has acquired 
further interest in assets, the exact nature and extent of which are unknown 
to plaintiff, which include, but which are not limited to, interest in a 
limited partnership. These remaining assets of the parties should be divided 
equally between the parties according to monetary value, one-half to each. 
22. Plaintiff is unaware of any debts or obligations incurred by the 
parties which are presently outstanding, other than the mortgage indebtedness 
on the real property. In the event that any such debts or obligations exist, 
defendant should be ordered to pay and assume these debts and obligations and 
should be ordered to hold the plaintiff harmless thereon. Each party should 
be ordered to pay and assume all debts and obligations incurred in his or her 
own name since the date of filing of the Complaint for Divorce in this action, 
and each should be ordered to hold the other harmless thereon. 
23. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all necessary 
documents to transfer the title and ownership of the property of the parties 
pursuant to the Decree entered in this action. 
24. Each party should be ordered to pay and assume his or her own court 
costs and attorney's fees incurred herein in the event this matter is 
uncontested. In the event this matter is contested, defendant should be 
ordered to pay plaintiff1s reasonable court costs and attorney's fees in an 
amount to be determined by the court. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for the following relief: 
1. For a Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony existing 
between the parties, the same to become final and effective innediately upon 
Che signing and entry thereof by the court. 
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2. For said Decree to be granted in accordance with the Complaint of the 
plaintiff, as set forth above. 
3. For such other and further relief as to the court may seem just and 
proper, 
DATED THIS ^ day of _ ^ j ? J ^ f ^ j ^ £ l , 1987. 
CORFORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY C, ^ RPORDBK^^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's address: 
2063 Hubbard Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
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